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"FOR SALE: Luxurious, roomy, 2 bedroom Condominium, tennis
courts, swimming pool, fronts on ocean. Under $10,000." Under ten thous-
and dollars? The concept of time sharing ownership turns that price into
reality. Time sharing ownership is an outgrowth of the continuing desire
of persons to own a vacation home, spawned by the popularity of resort
condominiums.
With the rapid' growth and development of residential and resort
condominiums during the last twenty years, the concept of ownership of
"airspace"' has become an accepted part of real property law.2 A condo-
minium is a system of separate ownership of individual units in a multiple
1. Under traditional real property law, the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos controlled. "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns
also to the sky and to the depths." Thus an owner of a piece of land owned every-
thing above and below to an indefinite extent. See United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946). See also 2 BLACKSTONE COMMNTARIES 18 (Lewis ed. 1902); 1 CoKE
INSTITUTES ch. 1, § l(4a) (19th ed. 1832); Merrill, Cooper & Papell, An Overview of
California Condominium Law, 6 Sw. U.L. Rlv. 487, 493 (1974).
2. Some economists predict that 50% of the population in the United States
will live in condominiums by the year 2000. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAxN DE-
VELOPAIENT, QUESTIONS ABOUT CONDomiNIuMs, 3 CHUD-365-F (June 1974). All 50
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unit building in which each purchaser receives by deed a fee simple interest
in an apartment and an undivided interest as tenant in common in the
facilities and areas of the building which are used by all residents or
members of the condominium.3 The concept thus contemplates two distinct
tenures, one in severalty and one in common, both inseparably joined in
a condominium.
A substantial portion of condominium growth has been in the resort
condominium area, although development in this sphere has been severely
restricted by the dramatic escalation in costs of land, labor and materials,
and the attendant decline in profitability to the developer.4 Resort develop-
ers sought to devise a vehicle by which the cost of ownership of a vacation
condominium could be significantly reduced. The optimal goal was to
provide a prospective purchaser the opportunity to acquire and pay for a
real property ownership interest only for the time period during which the
owner of the unit and his family or guests would actually occupy the con-
dominium. The idea of purchasing an ownership interest in the unit only
for the desired vacation period caused the concept of the condominium
regime to be expanded one step further, resulting in the emergence of a
new property concept: the time-share estate5 vacation condominium.
This Comment will focus upon the major impediments to widespread
acceptance of time sharing involving fee ownership.8 After an initial
states have passed condominium enabling legislation. For a listing of citations to
condominium legislation, see IA P. RoIAN & M. RESKIN, CONDoInNium LAW AND
PRACTICE, App. B-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as P. ROIIAN & M. RESmN]. For a
history of condominium growth in the United States, see Note, 29 CAsE W. REs.
L. REv. 228, 232 (1978).
3. The Missouri Condominium Property Act, RSMo §§ 448.010-.220
(1978), does not define the term condominium. An extensive definition of the
term may be found, however, in Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1972). A condominium
is to be distinguished from a cooperative apartment, which is a multi-unit dwelling
in which each resident has an interest in the entity owning the building and a
lease entitling him to occupy a particular apartment within the building. See
Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.2d 321 (Civ. Ct.
1964). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1290, 1290 n.4 (1977).
4. See Mylod, The Mortgage Scene, 45 HousE & Hoarn 60 (April 1974). One
factor in increased costs was the imposition of environmental safeguards by many
states in reaction to the spoliation of their landscapes. See generally S. Cormt. ON
INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS LAND USE POLICY & PLANNING ASSISTANCE ACT, S. REP.
No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
5. The "time share estate" rubric was adopted by the UNIFORM CONDOMIN-
IUM ACT § 4-103, reprinted in IA P. Ro-AN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, App. B-6.
The concept is known under many different names, including interval ownership,
fractional time period ownership (FTOP), and time sharing ownership (TSO).
See Gray, Pioneering the Concept of Time-Sharing Ownership, 48 ST. JoN's
L. REv. 1196 (1974); Roodhouse, Fractional Time Period Ownership of Recrea-
tional Condominiums, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 35 (1975). The term fractional time
period ownership was coined by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, in UNIroas LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, TENTATIW DRAr No. 4.
6. This Comment will only examine time share techniques which involve
fee simple ownership of vacation homes on a time sharing basis. Other time sharing
arrangements not involving fee simple ownership of a real property interest, such as
"vacation licenses" and "club memberships," where ownership and title remain in
[Vol. 45
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description of the time-sharing estate concept, this Comment will examine
the three foremost problem areas in this fast developing field: dangers of
foreclosure of a time sharing interest because of a federal tax lien; the
effectiveness and legal validity of agreements not to partition; and the
extent and basis for potential tort liability of unit owners. In each of these
areas, problems arise when traditional real property solutions are applied
to problems for which real property principles were not designed. The
Comment will then pinpoint the need for legislation in these areas.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE TnmE SHARE EsTrATE
The concept of time sharing entails division of the fee simple owner-
ship of a condominium unit into several separate time periods.7 Such a
division results in what one writer has described as "condominiumizing
the condominium."s Each unit is owned by the vacationer only for the
period he desires to be in possession. A time period may range in duration
from one week to several months, and gives different owners (those having
an interest in the fee) the right to exclusive occupancy for that period
only. The right to occupy the condominium during that time period
typically recurs annually for an unlimited number of years. Additionally,
management ordinarily purchases a two-week time period out of every six
months for necessary in-unit maintenance work.9
The vacation condominium time share development essentially operates
as does the ordinary condominium complex. 10 Each unit, however,
rather than having only one owner, may have virtually an unlimited
number of owners. The unit owners collectively constitute the owners'
association. This body operates and manages the common areas1 of the
the developer, are beyond the scope of this Comment. For discussion of these two
arrangements, see J. BUSH, Planning to Meet Problems of Non-business Property:
Co-ops; Condominiums; Nonexotic Realty; Exotic Types of Real Property, Time
shared Property; Domicile and Conflicts of Laws, 35 Part 2 Nmv YoRK UNivEasrn,
INsnrruTE ON Frnmaur. TAXATION 1403, 1421-23 (1977); Outen, Latter Day Time
Sharing, LAw. Trrr. Nmws 5 (July-Aug. 1974).
7. For additional general discussions of the time-share estate concept, see 1
Part 2 P. RonmN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, §§ 17C.01-.03; Davis, Time-Sharing
Ownership: Possibilities & Pitfalls, 5 REAL Esr. Rzv. 49 (1975); Liebman, Can
Condominium Time-Sharing Work?, 3 REAL EST. REv. 40 (1973).
8. Note, New Ideas in the Vacation Home Market, 48 ST. JonN's L. REv.
1203, 1216 (1974).
9. See 1 Part 2 P. RoHAN & M. RP.sim, supra note 2, § 17C.01.
10. Theoretically, time sharing ownership need not be confined to the con-
dominium format. See Johnakin, Legislation for Time Share Ownership Projects, 10
REAL PROP., PRoB. & TR. J. 606, 610 (1975) (stating that time share ownership
could be made applicable to planned unit developments and traditional subdi-
visions as well as to condominiums).
11. The areas of a condominium complex available for use by all unit owners
are called common areas or common elements, and include the land upon which
the building is situated, lobbies, foundations and the like. A list of typical common
areas and facilities may be found in 1 P. RoHN & M. R~smN, supra note 2, §
6.01[2]. Most states define the term common element within their condominium
statutes. See, e.g., RSMo § 448.010 (1978) which defines "common elements" as
1980]
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complex through an annually-elected board of managers who are given
authority to conduct the affairs of the association. An annual charge is
assessed each unit owner to cover operational and managerial expenses.
The generic term "time sharing ownership" is used to describe the
two distinct techniques which have been developed to permit fee simple
ownership of vacation homes on a time share basis. Each technique involves
a separate and distinct real property concept and thus is identified by a
different name. An interval estate is defined by the Uniform Condominium
Act as:
A combination of (i) an estate for years in a unit, during the
term of which title to a unit rotates among the time-share owners
thereof, vesting in each of them in turn for periods established by
a fixed recorded schedule, with the series thus established recurring
regularly until the term expires, coupled with (ii) a vested undi-
vided fee simple interest in the remainder in that unit, the
magnitude of that interest having been established by the declara-
tion or by the deed creating the interval estate.12
The second technique for conveying a time sharing estate, the time span
estate, is defined as:
A combination of (i) an undivided interest in a present estate in
fee simple in a unit, the magnitude of that interest having been
established by the declaration or by the deed conveying the time
span estate, coupled with (ii) the exclusive right to possession and
occupancy of that unit during a regularly recurring period
designated by that deed or by a recorded document referred to
therein.13
In both the interval estate and the time span estate a purchaser is also a
tenant in common with all other purchasers of the common areas of the
complex.
In essence the time span estate makes all unit owners tenants in
common in fee simple absolute, with each tenant in common having title
to the undivided interest specified in his deed. The undivided right to
possession and use of the whole property in its entirety is the one unity
among tenants in common. Therefore, to maintain the viability of time
sharing ownership, the time span method necessitates that a separate
agreement delineating each unit owner's specific period of occupancy be
entered into by all co-tenant-purchasers. 14 Each co-tenant also waives his
"all portions of the property except the unit." The statute goes on to define "unit"
as "a part of the property including one or more rooms, occupying one or more
floors or a part or parts thereof, designed and intended for any type of independent
use, and having lawful access to a public way."
12. UNIFORM CONDOMINIUm Aar § 4-103, reprinted in IA P. RoHAN & M.
RESKIN, supra note 2, App. B-6.
13. Id.
14. See R. POWELL & P. RorAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ff 633.2 (abr. ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as R. PowELL].
[Vol. 45
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right to seek partition.15 The time span estate is freely alienable, either
inter vivos by deed or by testamentary transfer.
The interval estate technique is conceptually more difficult than the
time span method. Purchasers do not take title to each condominium unit
as tenants in common; rather, the purchaser receives two separate and
distinct vested interests in the unit. First, the interval estate owner acquires
a defeasible fee in the form of an estate for years for the time period in
each year during which he is entitled to occupancy. This defeasible fee
will continue to vest in the owner for a period of years equal to the
expected useful life of the building as a resort complex. For example, an
interval estate owner may purchase a defeasible fee for the first two weeks
in July for the next forty years. The owner's fee, being defeasible, is subject
to a shifting executory interest' 6 which passes the fee to the next owner
upon commencement of a subsequent time period, such as the third week
of July in the above example.
The second interest acquired by the owner of an interval estate is a
vested remainder as a tenant in common with the other interval estate
owners of the unit, upon the termination of the defeasible fee interest.
This collective remainder interest was added to the defeasible fee arrange-
ment in an attempt to eliminate any possible violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 1 7 At the remote date when the interval estate owners become
tenants in common, they may, if they choose, repeat the cycle for another
period of years. The interval estate differs from the time span estate in
that the right of occupancy and title of ownership coincide; the interval
owner is the sole owner of the unit during his period of occupancy. Also,
the right of occupancy arises by reason of the ownership interest, and not
by reason of some contract or lease as under the time span estate.'8
The primary advantage of time sharing ownership is the low cost of
the property interest purchased. A time-share estate owner also experiences
the intangible satisfaction of owning a place of his own. He need not be
concerned with making vacation reservations months ahead of time, nor
is he subject, to escalating motel costs. Additional advantages of owning a
vacation time-share estate include interest and real estate tax deductions,
15. See notes 41-66 and accompanying text infra.
16. A shifting executory interest is a real property interest which shifts title
from one transferee to another. A fee simple subject to a shifting executory interest
is an estate where, upon the happening of an event specified in the grant, the fee
simple is automatically transferred to a third person, and not to the original grantor
or his heirs. See 5 R. Pow.LL, supra note 14, If 779[3], at 639.
17. Only future litigation will decide conclusively whether this does indeed
avoid the perpetuities problem. The Rule Against Perpetuities provides that no
interest in property subject to a condition precedent (i.e., a condition which must
be fulfilled prior to the interest passing to the grantee) is good unless the condition
must be satisfied, if at all, within 21 years after a designated life in being at the
creation of the property interest. When the Rule is violated, the conveyance is void.
See Davis, supra note 7, at 51.
18. See Outen, Interval Ownership-A Truly Unique Concept, LAw. TITLE
Nxws 2 (May-June 1973).
1980]
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equity buildup, and the possibility of leveraged appreciation leading, to a
profit upon resale.19
For the developer, the advantage of time share estates results from the
higher sales price he receives from each unit. In fact, the price markup of
a unit sold as time share estates may be from 15 to 100% higher than the
selling price of a comparable non-time sharing unit.2 0
All is not bliss, however, for time share owners and developers. Before
time sharing ownership's full potential can be achieved, several significant
legal uncertainties need to be resolved. These questions are presented below.
III. LEGAL HURDLES TO TIME SHARING OWNERSHIP
A. Impact of Federal Tax Lien
A problem unique to time-span estate ownership 2 ' is the possibility
that a federal tax lien might force the sale of all co-ownership interests in
the condominium unit to satisfy one co-tenant's tax liability. Such a tax
foreclosure sale would cause the ousting of all co.tenants from their vacation
home.2 2 Interval ownership, in contrast, would permit the taxing authority
to sell the delinquent taxpayer's interest but not the interests of all other
time share owners in the unit.
19. A potential disadvantage of the time share estate is that upon attempted
resale real estate agents may be unwilling to list the time share. This is because of
the huge number of time sharing periods offered in connection with a single com-
plex and the relatively low selling price against which sales commissions would be
taken. Another potential disadvantage exists for owners of off-season time shares.
Generally, time share owners pay a pro rata share of the yearly utility bill for their
unit. As a result, those owners with summer periods effectively subsidize winter
users' heating bills. Moreover, off-season owners save little by not using the con-
dominium during their period. They are liable for their pro rata share of utilities
for the active in-season period, irrespective of their actual use.
20. See Ingleby, Time Sharing: New Hope for the Second Home Industry?,
5 REAL EsT. REv. 96, 97 (1975). This profit is significantly offset, however, by the
higher marketing and sales costs resulting from the need for many more sales. See
generally Gray, supra note 5, at 1201 (total value of time-share ownership unit is
125 to 150% of market price for same unit if it were sold as a condominium).
21. This problem does not affect interval estate owners, because each is an
owner in severalty only for his particular period of ownership and retains no
ownership interest during any other part of the year. He therefore remains immune
from a tax deficiency action brought against another co-owner.
22. There also arises the specter of a state tax lien attaching to the time share
unit which may trigger a forfeiture sale for the non-payment of taxes by one or
more of the time-share estate owners. A brief discussion of the problem of state
tax liens is presented herein. Due to the individuality and uniqueness of each
state's real property law, however, counsel is urged to examine the law of the par-
ticular state in interest to ascertain any statutory variations affecting the general
discussion below. See, e.g., RSMo §§ 137.075-.285 (1978) (assessment of real
property and tax liens thereon). The problem is that state assessors are not required
to separately assess each time share owner's interval, absent a legislative mandate
to do so. Instead, a single assessment is made for the unit as a whole, with the
owners then being jointly and severally liable as a group for payment of the tax
assessment. Assessing the unit as a whole eliminates the need for an assessor to
have to place a monetary valuation on each of the different time periods owned.
Such valuation differences could be substantial. For example, a week in December
[Vol. 45
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss3/3
TIME SHARING CONDOMINIUMS
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a general tax lien
in. favor of the United States for unpaid federal taxes.23 The right of the
government to enforce its lien on the property against all co-owners, by
either joint or several liability, is an incident of co-tenancy ownership.2 4
Once activated,2 5 the lien attaches to "all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to ... [the person] liable to pay any
tax."2
6
Section 7403 of the Code authorizes the court enforcing the lien to sell
any property in which the taxpayer has an interest.2 7 There currently is
some dispute whether this section authorizes the sale of the entire property
held jointly with others or only the tax-delinquent tenant's interest.2 8 The
ramifications of the question are dear: if the government can sell the
entire unit to satisfy a lien on one co-tenant's property, the potential for
harming innocent co-owners is great. Furthermore, each co-tenant would
be a necessary party to any action brought by the government.2 9
The Fifth Circuit's 1962 decision in Folsum v. United States3 o was the
first to address the scope of section 7403 vis-a-vis jointly held property. In
at a popular ski area may cost many times more than a week in May. Recent Colo-
rado legislation, passed as a result of lobbying by the state's assessors, codifies the
assessor's right to assess the unit as a whole. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-33-111(3)
(Supp. 1978). This legislation portends serious trouble for time share owners seeking
separate assessment of their individual time periods to avoid responsibility for
another time share owner's taxes. Until such separate assessment is adopted, the
possibility of a state tax lien affecting all time share owners in a given unit will
remain.
23. I.R.C. § 6321 states: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or re-
fuses to pay the same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person."
24. State condominium enabling acts frequently include provisions for tax
liens on units and each co-owner's liability thereon. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.120 (West Supp. 1979); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 183A, § 14 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1969); N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAw §8 339-y to -z (McKinney 1968); OR. REV. STAT.
§8 9l.575-.580 (1969); VA. CODE § 55-79.42 (1977).
25. See W. PLUmB, FEDERAL TAx LrENs 10 (3d ed. 1972) (discussion of for-
malities which trigger a 'lien).
26. I.R.C. § 6321. Property held in the name of a straw party is not subject
to a lien for taxes of the straw party, but is for taxes of the true owner. Compare
United States v. Johnson, 200 F. Supp. 589 (D. Ariz. 1961) with United States v.
Pittman, 449 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lewis, 272 F. Supp. 993
(N.D. Ill. 1967).
27. IR.C. § 7403(a) authorizes the government to bring an action in federal
district court "to enforce the [§ 6321] lien.. . or to subject any property, of what-
ever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to
the payment of such tax or liability."
28. See W. PLUmB, supra note 25, at 35; Davis, Time-Sharing Ownership-
Legal & Practical Problems, 48 ST. JoHm's L. REv. 1183, 1186 (1974); Roodhouse,
supra note 5, at 46.
29. I.R.C. § 7403(b) states: "All persons having. . or claiming any interest
in the property involved in such action [to enforce the government's lien] shall be
made parties thereto."
30. 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
1980]
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resolving the issue of whether the government could force a sale of property
held jointly with the delinquent taxpayer, the court declared that while
the United States could "obtain the last vestige of title and every right
which such taxpayer owns ... , [t]he law does not authorize... [it] to
force a sale of the property of other joint owners, deny them the right to
seek a partition in kind, and to tax them with the costs incurred by the
Government in pursuing the delinquent taxpayer."3 ' Unfortunately, this
viewpoint was not to prevail for long.
Just two years later, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Trilling32
examined this same issue. In Trilling, the government sought to sell land
owned jointly by husband and wife to satisfy a federal tax lien against
the husband. The court, after considering the congressional intent behind
section 7403, stated that "the express language of the statute negates any
design or intent on the part of Congress to limit the reach of the statute
to the 'interest' of the taxpayer as distinguished from the 'property' in
which he has such 'interest.' ",3 The Trilling court, while recognizing that
its holding would be contrary to the Folsum decision, nonetheless held that
section 7403 does empower a court to order a sale of the entire property,
including any co-ownership interest, and to charge such co-ownership
interest with any of the fees, costs, or expenses incident to the sale.34
Subsequent to Trilling, a majority of circuits confronted with the issue
have adhered to that court's analysis.35 These courts hold that section
7403 authorizes the government to sell in its entirety any property in which
the taxpayer has an interest in order to enforce its lien upon a delinquent
taxpayer's property. Additionally, the Folsum minority position was under-
mined significantly by the Fifth Circuit case of Broday v. United States.36
Broday held that despite a Texas statute exempting community property
from antenuptial debts, a lien would attach to the wife's interest in a
community checking account for a tax deficiency assessed against her prior
to marriage.
The view adopted by a majority of the circuits allowing the sale of
property in its entirety rather than just the delinquent taxpayer's interest
may be influenced by the more moderate stance taken by the Tenth Circuit
31. Id. at 367.
32. 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
33. Id. at 703.
34. Id. at 702.
35. See United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972) (tenants in
common); Washington v. United Stat, s, 402 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1968) (wife's inchoate
dower interest); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (com-
munity property). Contra, Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
See also United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973) (relying on
equitable considerations in holding that a wife s interest in a homestead should
not be sold in its entirety).
36. 455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 45
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in United States v. Eaves.37 The Eaves court held that while section 7403
authorizes the court to order a sale of jointly held property to satisfy an
outstanding federal tax lien against one co-tenant, the statute does not
compel the court to exercise this full measure of authority. Rather, the
Eaves court declared, section 7403 confers broad discretion upon the courts
in fashioning a remedy: "[W]e do not believe that section 7403 makes
foreclosure an 'all or nothing' proposition."38
The allowance of equitable considerations as a factor in the application
of section 7403 softens the potentially harsh impact of Trilling and its
progeny upon time share owners. Furthermore, it may be possible to dis-
tinguish the time sharing situation because all cases involving sale of co-
owned property to enforce a federal tax lien have involved a husband and
wife rather than unrelated co-tenants who would typically be the owners
of a condominium unit in a time sharing arrangement. Whether the
presence of unrelated parties would influence the court is uncertain; if
combined with the innocence of the co-tenants and hardships which would
be imposed upon them by a sale of the property, a court sitting in equity
might be persuaded to exercise discretion and authorize sale of only the
delinquent taxpayer's interest in the unit rather than the entire unit.
Indeed, as the market for time sharing units expands, the government
probably will be able to realize more money by selling the delinquent
owner's time-span property interest rather than the unit as a whole. Selling
the entire unit rather than just the time span estate would obligate the
government to divide sale proceeds proportionately with nonindebted co-
owners.39 After such division, the government's share could be less than
the sale price of the time span estate sold separately.
The pragmatic answer to the federal tax lien problem is that while
the potential effect of foreclosure resulting from a federal tax lien would
be devastating, the likelihood of such a sale is small. Suits to foreclose
pursuant to a federal tax lien are extremely rare.4 0 Additionally, other
assets of the delinquent taxpayer could be sold first to satisfy the lien,
leaving the time span estate intact. Moreover, co-owners would be likely to
purchase a deficient taxpayer's interest once trouble arose to prevent any
possibility of foreclosure. The cost to each co-owner would be slight, and
certainly less than the cost of hiring an attorney to represent the co-tenants
in a foreclosure suit.
37. 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 871. See also United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957)(court not compelled to use tax lien foreclosure remedy); United States v. Over-
man, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that Congress intended court to func-
tion with the full traditional flexibility of the chancellor); United States v. Hersh-
berger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying equitable considerations).
39. If a sale is decreed, the distribution of the proceeds are made "according
to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the
United States." I.R.C. § 7403(c).
40. See W. PLUMB, supra note 25, at 3.
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B. Threat of Partition
An action for judicial partition 4l is perhaps the most apparent danger
associated with the time sharing arrangement. A right to seek partition
ostensibly arises whenever there is co-ownership with other unit owners
of various parts of the development.4 2 Under time span estate ownership,
the threat of partition exists toward both the common elements and the in-
dividual condominium units. Partition of an individual unit is possible
because all co-owners are tenants in common.
Under the interval estate arrangement the threat of an action for
partition exists only as to the common elements of the vacation complex.
This is because each owner obtains a defeasible fee for the period during
which he is entitled to possession and does not hold the unit itself as a
tenant in common. Prohibiting partition of the common elements is
necessary because time sharing ownership of a unit would be untenable
without free use of the common elements by the occupants.
The right of a co-tenant to bring an action for judicial partition is
one of the fundamental common law rights attaching to any co-tenancy
property interest.43 Partition is favored by the courts on the ground that it
not only promotes peace and enjoyment of property, but also facilitates
transmission of titles and eliminates the inconvenience of joint holding.44
41. Partition is defined as the division between two or more persons of lands,
tenements, or hereditaments belonging to them as co-owners. BALLENTNE's LAw
DICTIONARY 918 (3d ed. 1979). In Missouri, partition is allowed by statute. See
RSMo § 528.030 (1978). See also State ex rel. State Park Bd. v. Tate, 365 Mo. 1213,
295 S.W.2d 167 (En Banc 1956) (defining partition). Partition proceedings enable
co.tenants of a real property interest to terminate the tenancy so as to vest in each
former co-tenant a separate individual estate in specific property or an allotment of
the lands. Partition achieves an absolute severance of the individual interests of
each joint owner and, after partition, each has the right to use and enjoy his estate
free of interference from former co-tenants. Whenever a joint estate cannot be
physically divided-as would be the case with one condominium unit owned by
many individuals-the -decree will order the property sold and the proceeds di-
vided among the co-tenants. See Comment, Partition in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 87
(1941).
42. RSMo § 528.030 (1978). The general rule in Missouri is that joint owners
have an absolute right to partition absent an express or implied agreement not to
partition. Stout v. Stout, 564 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (declaring an
agreement waiving the right to partition invalid as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation if it contains no limitation upon time or express contingency which can
terminate the agreement).
43. See R. POWELL, supra note 14, flf 609-14. Land must be held in co-tenancy
before division by judicial partition will be granted. Without a co-tenancy relation-
ship there can be no compulsory partition since the primary purpose of the par-
tition statute was to remove the difficulties resulting from common possession.
Several persons together may own an entire parcel of property without being co-
tenants thereof and in such case they are not entitled to partition any more than
if they were owners of separate pieces of property (for example, where an owner
in fee simple absolute conveys the coal rights to one person, and sand and gravel
rights to another). All parties to a partition action must have an undivided interest
in the whole. See Comment, supra note 41, at 88.
44. See Flournoy v. Kirkman, 270 Mo. 1, 192 S.W. 462 (1917); Stout v. Stout,
564 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). See also Rubens, Right of First Refusal &
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Legislation has been enacted in Missouri, for example, to permit compul-
sory partition when co-ownership becomes too burdensome.4 5
The key question in the time share context is whether the partition
right may be effectively waived by contractual agreement. The general
rule is that a valid waiver of partition rights can be effected. 46 The courts
have cited estoppel47 and waiver48 as the two major grounds for upholding
the enforceability of such agreements.
The important qualification to the general rule is that an agreement
never to partition is not enforceable as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation.4 9 Similarly, an agreement which restricts the right to partition
for an unreasonable length of time has been held unenforceable.5 0 Where
the agreement not to partition extends for a reasonable length of time, the
courts, in accordance with the Restatement of Property position, have
enforced it.51
In all time sharing documents currently in use, the grantee-purchaser
Waiver of the Right of Judicial Partition, 14 HAsmrNGs L.J. 255, 261 (1963); Com-
ment, Partition in the Modern Context, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 988.
45. See RSMo ch. 528 (1978). Section 528.010 provides in part:
[Any person... may sue in equity ... upon the ground that the life or
other estate of immediate enjoyment is burdensome and unprofitable or
that the cost of paying the taxes and assessments thereon and holding,
maintaining, caring for and preserving the lands from waste, or injury,
and deterioration, exceeds the reasonable value of the rents and profits
thereof, and that a greater income can probably be had from proceeds
of a sale thereof invested in bonds of the United States or of Missouri or
some municipality or school district thereof or first lien mortagage loans
upon lands situate in this state ....
46. See Petty v. Griffith, 352 Mo. 540, 165 S.W.2d 412 (1942); Mastin v. Ire-
land, 320 Mo. 617, 8 S.W.2d 900 (1928); Springer v. Bradley, 188 S.W. 175 (Mo.
1916); Mack v. Mack, 286 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. App., St. L. 1956); Annot., 37
A.L.R.3d 962, 968 (1971).
47. See Twin Lakes Reservior & Canal Co. v. Bond, 156 Colo. 433, 401 P.2d
586 (1965); Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1957); Ortmann v. Kraemer,
190 Kan. 76, 378 P.2d 26 (1963); Odstroil v. McGlaun, 230 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 971 (1971).
48. See Ortmann v. Kraemer, 190 Kan. 76, 378 P.2d 26 (1963); Carter v.
Weowna Beach Community Corp., 71 Wash. 2d 498, 429 P.2d 201 (1967). See also
Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 971 (1971).
49. See Vollmer v. Wheeler, 42 Cal. App. 1, 183 P. 264 (1919); Condrey v.
Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1957); Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188,
19 S.W. 75 (1892); Stout v. Stout, 564 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (expressly
upholding this rule). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 979 (1971). Although
traditionally an agreement not to partition has been viewed as a restraint on
alienation, this logic breaks down in the context of time sharing estates. Under a
time sharing plan an agreement not to partition actually enhances the saleability
or "alienability" of each owner's interest. This is so because it removes the threat
of impairment of one's interest through partition, which otherwise would limit
the marketability of the time shares.
50. Stout v. Stout, 564 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Mack v. Mack. 286
S.W.2d 385 (Mo. App., St. L. 1956).
51. See RMSTATEMENT Or PROPERTY § 412 (1944). This section states, "A re-
straint on the power of a co-tenant to compel partition, created to last for a
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expressly covenants against partition.5 2 Most of these documents limit the
life of the partition agreement to fifty-five or sixty years, the anticipated
life of the building.58 The legality of this limitation remains uncertain.54
A statutory prohibition of judicial partition, similar to that drafted
for condominium legislation, would be the optimal solution to the partition
problem. 55 A statute making partition proscribable by express intention
of the creator of the interests would be another viable alternative.r 6 With-
out legislation of some kind there is simply no certain answer to the par-
tition question.
To be effective, a partition agreement should be binding on all future
co-owners. Privity of contract may not be relied upon because of the
possibility of passage of title by noncontractual methods such as probate,
an execution sale, or refusal by a subsequent grantee to so contract with
52. See I Part 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 17C.02[1], for illustra-
tive time and interval ownership forms. Some courts also have held that an agree-
ment not to partition will be implied where the purpose of the contract entered
into would be defeated by partition. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 962, 976 (1971).
53. See 1 Part 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 17C.02[1].54. Most courts have taken a liberal attitude toward the reasonableness of
the duration of partition agreements in contexts other than time sharing. See
Smith v. Brasseale, 213 Ala. 441, 105 So. 199 (1925) (reasonable time determined
by purpose for which agreement made); Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 428 (Fla.
1957) (lives in being, reasonable); Mastin v. Ireland, 820 Mo. 617, 8 S.W.2d 900(1928) (upholding agreement not to partition until death of widow); Springer v.
Bradley, 188 S.W. 175 (Mo. 1916) (upholding agreement not to partition
while mortgage indebtedness remained on property); Mack v. Mack, 286 S.W.2d
885 (Mo. App., St. L. 1956) (until youngest child of parties is 18 years old or wife
remarries, reasonable); Michalski v. Michalski, 50 N.J. Super. 454, 142 A.2d 645(App. Div. 1958) (lives of parties, reasonable; parties were advanced in years);
Busclhmann v. McDermott, 154 A.D. 515, 139 N.Y.S. 314 (1913) (until first of three
persons dies, reasonable); Ogilby v. Hickok, 144 A.D. 61, 128 N.Y.S. 860 (1911)(until last of heirs dies, reasonable). None of these cases, however, involved an
agreement extending even half the duration of the standard time sharing partition
agreement's 60-year provision.
The RESTATENMENT oF PROPERTY defines reasonableness according to the parame-
ters of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Any agreement of longer than 21 years plus
lives in being is per se unreasonable. See RESTATEM NT OF PROPERTY § 173, Com-
ment c (1944). This rigid rule would make the 60-year restraint on the right to
partition void ab initio because the Rule Against Perpetuities is violated if any
conceivable set of circumstances could stretch the length of the agreement beyond
the period allowed by the Rule.
55. See, e.g., RSMo § 448.070 (1978) which provides:
As long as the property is subject to the provisions of this chapter the
common elements shall, except as provided in section 448.140, remain
undivided, and no unit owner shall bring any action for partition or
division of the common elements. Any covenant or agreement to the con-
trary shall be null and void. Nothing contained herein, however, shall
prevent partition of a unit as between co-owners thereof, if such right of
partition shall otherwise be available, but such partition shall not be in
kind.
See generally Comment, Missouri Condominium Property Act of 1963, 29 Mo. L.
REV. 238, 243 (1964) (examining the Rule Against Perpetuities and Missouri's 1963
Condominium Property Act).
56. A few states have chosen this option in their conventional condominium
statutes. See R. POWELL, supra note 14, jf 290 n.98.
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the other owners. 57 The method presently used to bind successors in title
is recordation of the terms of the declaration of rights and duties prior to
the first sale of a unit and reliance on the doctrine of equitable servitudes.58
Because an agreement not to partition restricts the right of the unit owner
to deal with his land, it is similar to an equitable servitude which usually
prohibits certain physical uses of the land. 59 Both an equitable servitude
and an agreement not to partition are essentially negative promises which
are enforced to promote compatible and homogeneous land development.6 9
In order for a covenant not to partition to bind subsequent purchasers
under the doctrine of equitable servitudes, the parties must intend that the
covenant run 68 and there must be actual or constructive notice to all
purchasers for value against whom the agreement is to be enforced. 2 There
is little question that parties to a time sharing agreement intend the
agreement to bind successors in interest. Constructive notice may be given
future owners by the recording of the express promises 63 as contained in
the declaration of conditions, covenants, and restrictions. 64 The deed must
contain a provision making the recorded declaration applicable.
The threat of judicial partition in Missouri can be minimized with
proper drafting of the documents establishing the time sharing ar-
rangement. Missouri courts have upheld the validity of reasonable
agreements not to partition, and have endorsed the general principle of
binding successors of title to the partition agreement. 65 Therefore, it
would seem that judicial partition can be effectively avoided by a written
agreement of reasonable duration 6 which states the purpose for which
the restraint is imposed, and is made binding on all subsequent successors
in interest regardless of how title is acquired.
57. See Roodhouse, supra note 5, at 40.
58. See 1 Part 2 P. RoHAN & M. R.-smN, supra note 2, § 17C.01. An equitable
servitude is a covenant running with the land which is enforceable only in equity.
See 20 Am. JuR. 2d Covenants §§ 169, 173 (1977).
59. See generally Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Equitable Servi-
tudes, 28 Tx. L. REv. 194 (1949); Comment, Equitable and Contractual Defenses
to Partition, 18 StmN. L. REv. 1428, 1436 (1966).
60. When all parties are bound to an agreement not to partition, both domi-
nant and servient tenements arise between the overlapping estates of the joint
owners in the entire property. Thus, each person's interest is both dominant and
servient because its owner has promised not to partition and has received a like
promise. See Comment, supra note 59, at 1436.
61. See Williams, supra note 59, at 227.
62. Id. at 198.
63. See, e.g., RSMo §§ 59.010-.660 (1978) (pertaining to the recording of
real property interests).
64. See 1 Part 2 P. Rou._u & M. RESKIN, supra note 2, § 17C.02, for various
examples of the documentation currently in use by time share developers.
65. See Mastin v. Ireland, 320 Mo. 617, 8 S.W.2d 900 (1928); Springer v.
Bradley, 188 S.W. 175 (Mo. 1916). But see Flournoy v. Kirkman, 270 Mo. 1, 192
S.W. 462 (1917) (holding that absent dear expression of intent an agreement
not to partition does not bind heirs).
66. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Tort Liability
Shielding the time-share estate owner from tort liability is increasingly
important in these days of escalating jury verdicts.67 The three distinct
areas of potential tort liability to be discussed are: (1) liability of time
share owners for injury or damage from negligent upkeep or design of
common areas; (2) with respect to the time span estate, liability of co-
owners as tenants in common for injury or damage to a third party who
is on the premises of the unit while another co-owner has the right to
possession; and (8) liability of a time-share estate owner to his co-owners
for damage he negligently causes to the unit while he is in possession.
1. Liability for Common Area Injury
All time-share estate resort condominiums are composed of basically
two types of property:6 individual units owned in fee simple absolute by
the time-share estate owners; and common areas of the complex used and
enjoyed by all residents and their guests.69 The hallways and recreational
facilities are typical common areas. Because the common areas are main-
tained by a condominium association in which all owners are members,
association through the membership creates potential liability for a time-
share estate owner for injuries and accidents occurring in the common
area. The associational aspect of the time-share estate owner's liability is
identical to that of the full unit owner in a conventional condominium.
Much has been written by legal scholars in the past decade addressing
the question of common-area tort liability for the condominium owner,70
ways to minimize the risk,71 and prevention of imposition of liability on
67. An extensive list of possible sources of tort liability in the condominium
complex may be found in 1 P. Ro-r. & M. R-sKIN, supra note 2, § 10A.O3[1].
68. See 1 Part 2 P. RonAu & M. REsIUN, supra note 2, §§ 17C.01-.03.
69. A time sharing regime also may have limited common areas such as a
balcony or patio shared with more than one unit owner but not available for use
by all residents.
70. See 1 Part 2 P. RoHAN & M. REsKmN, supra note 2, §§ 10A.01-.06; Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. Ray. 987, 995
(1963); Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1,
17 (1963); Lawrence, Tort Liability of a Condominium Unit Owner, 2 REAL EST.
L.J. 789 (1974); Rohan & Reskin, God, Man & the Condominium: Casualty Loss
& Tort Liability, 33 J. PROP. MAN. 32 and 75 (1968); Note, White v. Cox: Tort
Actions Against the Condominium Association-Implications for the Individual
Owner, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 586 (1972); Note, Condominium Unit Owner Has
Standing to Sue Unincorporated Unit Owners' Association for Injuries Inflicted
Because of the Association's Negligence, 25 VAND. L. REv. 271 (1972); Amnot., 45
A.L.R.8d 1171 (1972). See also Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx.
L. Rxv. 399 (1939); Prosser, Joint Torts & Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413
(1937).
71. See Jackson, Why You Should Incorporate a Homeowner's Association, 3
REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1975); Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas?
An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1971); Note, Condominium Casualty and Lia-
bility Insurance, 48 ST. JonN's L. REv. 1112 (1974); Note, Condominiums: In-
corporation of the Common Element-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321 (1970).
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all owners of the condominium complex. 72 Although there are significant
distinctions between the rights and liabilities of the time-share estate owner
and the condominium owner in other contexts, the principles and authorit-
ies dealing with the subject of common-area tort liability of the conven-
tional condominium owner are fully applicable to the time-share estate
owner. In addition to being cognizant of this aspect of liability, the attorney
also should know that such risks can be reduced by incorporation of the
owner's association 73 and through comprehensive insurance coverage.7 4
Still unanswered questions in this area include: standing of a unit owner
to sue another owner in tort for an injury occurring in the common area;
viability of actions by a unit owner against the condominium association;
standing of household members and guests to commence a tort action;
enforceability of declaration and bylaw provisions barring a unit owner's
cause of action in negligence or exonerating management for all but willful
wrongs; ability of a unit owner to satisfy a judgment obtained by him
against the association of which he is a member; and applicability of the
assumption of risk defense against an owner in the project.75
2. Liability of Co-Owners for Injury to Third Parties
Where a time span estate exists, a question could arise concerning the
liability of all unit owners as tenants in common for an injury within a
particular unit, not in the common area, as a result of the negligence of a
co-owner in possession of that unit. This is not an issue in the interval
estate framework because each interval estate owner has a defeasible fee
in the unit during his period of possession, exclusive of all rights and
liabilities of persons in whom title may vest later in the cycle. Thus, under
the interval estate concept the negligence of one owner cannot be imputed
to a subsequent owner.
A different question is presented by time-span estate ownership.
Whether co-owners here can be liable for the negligent acts of another
co-owner depends on whether, for liability purposes, a court would construe
the time span estate to be a true tenancy in common or a new form of
property interest which subjects all co-owners to joint liability. It is well
72. See R. POWEL.L, supra note 14, ir 633.25; Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of
Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and Home
Owner Associations, 12 WAKE FoarsT L. REv. 915 (1976); Rohan, Perfecting the
Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort Liability and Insurance, 32
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 308-09 (1967); Comment, Community Apartments:
Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIf. L. Rxv. 299, 312-14 (1962); Annot.,
72 A.L.R.3d 314 (1976).
73. See articles cited note 70 supra.
74. Subsequent to the passage of condominium enabling legislation in all 50
states, insurance companies were quick to modify coverage to fit the condominium
format. Such has not been the case with time sharing ownership. Because of the
lack of specific statutory authorization in the time sharing area, there has been
much uncertainty as to the potential risks of insuring such interests. See 1 Part
2 P. RossA_ & M. REsKIN, supra note 2, §§ 10A.05[2], 11.01-.10.
75. See 1 Part 2 P. Ro-AN & M. REsKiN, supra note 2, §§ 10.01-.04.
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established that tenants in common in possession of real property are
jointly and severally liable for injuries arising by reason of a dangerous
condition on the premises.78 Where the injury is attributable solely to
the independent act of a single co-tenant, the general rule is that he alone
is liable.77 While this view would protect time-share estate owners from
negligent acts of other co-owners, a real threat exists that a court might
find that the time span estate does not make purchasers tenants in common,
but rather creates a different ownership interest altogether. Classification
as a tenancy in common results in a concurrent interest in which there is
a unity of possession by separate and distinct titles.78 In other words,
although each co-owner has separate title to some fraction of the property,
all share in "one single right to possession"79 which encompasses the entire
property. Under the time span estate, however, there is a written agreement
restricting this right to possession. The agreement is continuous and bind-
ing on successors in interest for the life of the time-sharing ownership
interest. It is therefore arguable that because the right to unqualified
possession is never present in a time span estate, the ownership interest
involved is not one of tenancy in common at all, but an entirely new form
of property ownership. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the
time-span estate owner waives his right to partition during the life of the
time share estate. This is in marked contrast to the usual tenancy in
common in which judicial partition is an ultimate solution to an intoler-
able tenancy.
An indication of a court's willingness to treat the time span estate as
a unique form of ownership can be gleaned from the landmark case of
White v. Cox.8 0 In White, the plaintiff (a condominium unit owner) sued
the condominium association for personal injuries caused by a negligently
placed water sprinkler in a common area. In an unprecedented decision,
the California Court of Appeals recognized an unincorporated condomin-
ium association as a jural entity capable of being sued.8 ' The holding in
White illustrates that in dealing with condominiums and other new forms
76. See Bryant v. Welles, 65 Fla. 355, 61 So. 748 (1913); Low v. Mumford, 14
Johns. 426 (N.Y. 1817); 20 AM. JUR. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 90
(1965).
77. Baker v. Fritts, 143 Ill. App. 465 (1908); Simpon v. Seavey, 8 Me. 138(1831); Marsh v. Hand, 120 N.Y. 315, 24 N.E. 463 (1890). See also 20 AM. JUR. 2d
Covenants § 90 (1965).
78. See Goforth v. Ellis, 300 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1957); G. THOMPSON,
MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1793 (1967).
79. See R. PowELL, supra note 14, If 617.
80. 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971). For a discussion of the
ramifications of White, see Note, Condominiums-Member of Unincorporated As-
sociation of Condominium Owners Permitted to Bring Personal Injury Action
Against Association for Negligent Maintenance of Common Areas, 40 FORDHAM L.
REV. 627 (1972); Note, Condominium Unit Owner Has Standing to Sue Unin-
corporated Unit Owners' Association for Injuries Inflicted Because of the As-
sociation's Negligence, 25 VAND. L. R~v. 271 (1972).
81. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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of real property ownership interests, courts need not be bound by out-
dated concepts developed in cases pertaining to other types of concurrent
ownership.
3. Liability of Owner to His Co-Owners for Damage to Unit
An area of tort liability unique to time sharing ownership is the lia-
bility of a time share owner to his co-owners for unit damage caused by his
negligent conduct. In the ordinary situation, expenses for the repair of a
damaged unit would be assessed by the condominium association against
the owner or owners of that unit. With multiple owners in the time sharing
context, however, repairs necessitated by the negligent conduct of one time
share owner should be paid for solely by that one owner and not assessed
to all co-owners of the unit. The problem in determining whether "neg-
ligent" conduct has caused the damage arises when occupancy changes every
two to six weeks.8 2 An efficient, reliable, and rapid means of determining
negligence is needed.
Contemporary judicial machinery is certainly too slow for resolving
questions of negligent conduct within the time-sharing ownership frame-
work. Moreover, resort to judicial processes would tend to blow the issue
out of proportion to the harm done. Most time-sharing resort properties
today authorize the managing agent to determine negligence.8 3 This would
appear to be the most efficient solution to the problem.
The system of abbreviated, administrative determination of negligence
is not, however, without problems. In essence, an owner's consent to a
determination of this type constitutes a waiver of the common law right to
a jury trial on the issue. Such a system would be acceptable only in cases
exclusively involving property damage and not personal injury. In addition,
it is essential that the managing agent's cursory determination not possess
evidentiary value in an ancillary tort action by one claiming injury as a
result of the owner's conduct. Finally, the scope of determination of negli-
gence should be limited to the sole issue of who is to pay for repair of the
damaged unit. This is, after all, the only issue which is of importance to
all co-owners.
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
A. Examining the Problem
While the problems previously discussed are the most commonly
recognized legal impediments to full acceptance of the time sharing estate,
a myriad of other problems combine to present a formidable challenge to
time-share estate development. Included therein are questions concerning
82. It is not difficult to imagine a potential dispute over whether a rock was
thrown through a window by vandals or the window was negligently broken from
within by over-enthusiastic party-goers.
83. See, e.g., 1 Part 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKrN, supra note 2, § 17C.021].
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title insurance of each owner's possessory share s 4 acquisition of financing to
build units and finance each sale, 5 applicability of securities law to sales
of time share interests,8 6 and marketing strategy to obtain public acceptance
of this new ownership concept. These questions point to the need for
thorough time sharing legislation. Just as condominium development
languished until the enactment of enabling legislation by the states in the
early sixties,8 7 it is doubtful that time sharing estates will achieve full
stature until a statutory framework for resolving these uncertainties is
enacted.
Legislation also is needed which would finally remove any question of
whether a unit owner's covenant not to partition is an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. Ideally, time sharing statutes, like their condominium
statute counterparts, should provide that the Rule Against Perpetuities and
the rule against restricting rights of alienation shall not be applied to
defeat any provision of the time sharing act.8 8
84. See Eagen, Title Insurance for Condominiums, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 210
(1963); Johnson, Condominium Practice: A Second Look, 51 N.D.L. Rav. 761,
764 (1975).
85. The availability of capital for building time sharing developments and
financing each unit is dependent upon many factors including the developer's
contacts, the money market, and lender confidence in the time share concept. See
Roodhouse, supra note 5, at 40.
86. An offering of interests in realty can constitute an offering of securities
under federal law. The primary factor is whether there is a substantial expectation
by an investor, relying on a vendor or third party, of an economic return on his
investment. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In 1973 the Innis-
free Corporation requested an opinion from the SEC as to whether the proposed
sale of time share estates would constitute security offerings. The SEC ruled that
it would recommend no action against Innisfree for failure to register the sales
under the Securities Act of 1933. Subsequently, however, the SEC has refused other
developers' requests for no action letters and is refusing to issue an opinion on the
question pending further study. [1974] FE. SEc. L. RE,. Dac. (CCH) ff 79,935.
Thus, the sale of time share estates may yet be classified as the sale of securities.
See Byrne, Securities Regulation of Time-Sharing Resort Condominiums, 7 RE-AL
EST. L.J. 3 (1978). See generally Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current
Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 -(1974); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condomin-
iums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 GEo. L.J. 1403 (1974); Comment, Looking
Through Form to Substance: Are Montana Resort Condominiums "Securities"?, 35
MONT. L. Rav. 265 (1974); Note, Securities: Another Way to Regulate the Resort
Development Boom, 27 OKaA. L. Rav. 104 (1974); Note, Shares of a State-Subsidized
Non-Profit Cooperative Housing Corporation Are Securities Under Federal Securi-
ties Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 623 (1975).
87. For a complete listing of all condominium legislation passed by the 50
states, see IA P. ROHAN & M. RsKiN, supra note 2, App. B-1.
88. See, e.g., RSMo § 448.210 (1978) which provides: "It is expressly provided
that the rule of property known as the rule against perpetuities and the rule of
property known as the rule restricting unreasonable restraints on alienation shall
not be applied to defeat any of the provisions of this chapter." See also Moller,
The Condominium Confronts the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 N.Y.L.F. 377
(1964); Comment, Missouri Condominium Property Act of 1963, 29 Mo. L. REv.
238, 243 (1964); Note, The Ohio Condominium Act, 33 U. CIN. L. REv. 463 (1964).
If the threat of violating the Rule Against Perpetuities is removed, the interval
estate would no longer need to include a vested remainder interest as a tenant in
common after a certain number of years. At least one commentator would continue
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There are other areas where legislation would be helpful. First, the
extent of the individual unit owner's liability in the time sharing context
is in need of greater clarification. Legislation would benefit not only
owners, but others as well. For example, the prospective plaintiff now has
a difficult time determining who is responsible for his injury, especially if
it occurs in a common area. In addition, statutory guidance is needed to
clarify the problem of judgment satisfaction, such as the liability of the
developer and non-culpable time share owners for all or part of a tort
judgment.B9
The question of real estate tax allocation also must be a part of any
effective time sharing legislation. Condominium statutes throughout the
United States provide that each condominium unit constitutes a separate
parcel of real estate for tax purposes. 90 Without such legislation directed
at the time share situation, tax assessors are unlikely to submit fractionalized
bills. Interval estate owners for tax purposes would be treated as individuals
who own different estates or interests in the same property; tax authorities
might be tempted to take the more convenient route of assessing each unit
as a single entity, levying one tax on the unit rather than assessing each
time share owner.91 Similarly, time span owners, who as tenants in common
generally are not entitled to separate assessment, should be so assessed. 92
A particularly pressing need for legislation regarding time share owner-
ship is to establish uniform terminology. Already there is considerable
terminological confusion, which unneccessarily amplifies the possibility
of litigation. Clear and succinct standardized definitions need to be de-
veloped for such terms as interval owner, time span owner, unit, time
share estate, and time share owner. Standardization of terms could reduce
confusion for the potential purchaser of a time share estate, who is already
at a disadvantage in understanding the property concept underlying his
ownership interest.93
to insist on this remainder over as tenants in common to provide a convenient
escape mechanism via judicial partition at the end of the property's economic life
as a vacation facility. See Davis, supra note 7, at 54.
89. See Note, Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common Element-A
Proposal, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 321, 341 (1970).
90. See, e.g., RSMo § 448.100 (1978) (all condominium units are to be
separately assessed and individually taxed).
91. This would cause a situation similar to the federal tax lien problem dis-
cussed in notes 21-40 and accompanying text supra, i.e., individual unit owners
who paid their pro rata share would then be subjected to the risk of tax lien fore-
closure, either federal or state, if any of their neighbors defaulted on the joint
obligation.
92. This follows from the fundamental real property principle which defines
a tenant in common as an owner in severalty of the whole who only shares
possession of the property jointly with other co-tenants. See R. POWELL, supra
note 14, iJ 602-05.
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B. Uniform Act Legislation
A uniform time-sharing ownership act has yet to be drafted.9 4 This
step and eventual adoption by at least the more popular resort states is an
obvious goal of nationwide developers who must now deal with the com-
plexities of individual state laws. Realistically, widespread adoption of a
uniform act is unlikely in the near future, given each state's unique interests
and concerns, especially in light of the fact that no state has yet adopted
the Uniform Condominium Act.95 A more practical hope is that the states
will enact locally-drafted legislation dealing with the problems of time
sharing, although only federal legislation can cure the problem involving
federal tax liens.
C. Proposed Legislative Action
State legislative action in the time sharing area has been negligible.
Only the states of Colorado, Florida, and Utah have adopted legislation
dealing with time sharing ownership. 6 Several states are, however, studying
the problem,97 although legislative enthusiasm appears to have subsided
from the fervor of the early seventies.
As a temporary alternative to legislation, California has enacted perti-
nent state administrative regulations. These regulations require time share
developers to submit plans and other information to state regulatory
bodies. The emphasis is upon public disclosure so as to prevent consumer
fraud in the sale of time share interests.98 These regulations are a step in
94. Tentative Draft No. 4 of the UNrFORm LAND TRANSACTIONs Acr (ULTA)
mentioned time sharing only in Article 4-103 pertaining to public offering state-
ments. The UNIFORM CONDOMINIUm Acr (UCA) and the sections from Article 4 per-
taining to time sharing were removed from the ULTA for further consideration at
the 1975 annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. The UCA, approved by the Conference in 1977, mentions time sharing
ownership only with regard to disclosure requirements pursuant to a public offer-
ing. UCA, Commissioners' Prefatory Notes, 7 U.L.A. 97, 98 (1978).
A few commentators have drafted proposed legislation to stimulate thinking
and legislative action in this area. None, however, has received widespread recog-
nition or attention. See Johnakin, note 10 supra; Roodhouse, supra note 5, at 59.
95. It must be noted, however, that the Act was only proposed in 1977.
96. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-111 (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 718.103-.116 (West Supp. 1979); UTAH CODF ANN. §§ 57-8-3 to -8-36 (1977).
97. See I Part 2 P. ROHAN & vi. REsKTN, supra note 2, § 17C.01. Hawaii, Mary-
land, and South Carolina currently have such proposals under consideration. In the
1974 legislative session, Hawaii passed a measure that would have recognized time
sharing interests or intervals as real property interests. See S. 2197-74, Hawaii Leg.
Sess. (1974) (enacted April 5, 1974, to amend § 513-2 (23) of the Horizontal Proper-
ty Act). This proposal was incorporated into a larger condominium bill that ulti-
mately was vetoed by the governor. A new time sharing bill was introduced in
Hawaii by Jt. Res. 734 in 1975, authorizing the Real Estate Commission to
review the proposed bill and report its findings and recommendations to the legis-
lature. The Commission responded in February of 1979 via S.C.R. No. 78 with
two tentative proposals yet to be adopted.
98. See 1 P. RoHAN & M. REsiN, supra note 2, § 3.05(2); IA P. RoHAN & l M.
REsKiN, supra note 2, App. B-2.
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the right direction, but lack the comprehensiveness necessary to deal with
the many problems associated with the time sharing concept.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to identify and analyze the major legal
questions surrounding the time-share estate form of ownership and the
need for legislative action in this area. It is unquestionable that the demand
for second home ownership will continue to expand; time sharing owner-
ship provides a practical, viable means of satisfying that demand. The
novel time-share approach to resort property development can solve many
of the difficult challenges faced by resort developers as land and construc-
tion costs spiral upward. Although many uncertainties still remain, it ap-
pears inevitable that time share estates will become a predominant vehicle
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